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pality. That Plaintiff's ownership of said abutting property 
includes the streets tpemselves, subject only to the use thereof 
by the public for highway purposes. The abutting property 
had been subdivided into building lots .. 
The Defendant municipal corporation, without obtaining 
the consent of Plaintiff, laid and constructed a 48-inch steel-
reinforced concrete water pipe line along and under the surface 
of said streets, for the purpose of conducting water to Salt 
Lake City, for the domestic and industrial users in said City; 
that the property abutting said streets was in no way served or 
benefitted by the said water pipe line. 
Plaintiff then.· alleged consequential damages resulting 
from Defendant's unlawful appropriation of, and trespass upon 
Plaintiff's property, followed by a prayer for a decree requiring 
Defendant to remove said line, to.enjoin Defendant from laying 
any line through said street, and for damages and costs. (R. 
PP· 1, 2.) 
Defendant's motion to dismiss upon the grounds the 
complaint failed to state a cause of action was granted. (R. 
pp. 5, 6.) 
Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint with substan-
tially the same allegations as contained in the original com-
plaint, as set out above; there was added, however, allegations 
that Plaintiff, because said water pipe line was laid in said 
streets, would be required to lay duplicate water and sewer 
lines to serve said property, and that duplicate gas lines would 
also be required, and that as a further result of said water pipe 
line, the development of said property as a residential sub-
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division would be materially retarded. The prayer for dam-
ages was the same as contained in the original complaint. _ (R. 
PP· 7, 8). 
Defendant's motion to dismiss the amended complaint 
for the same reason as for the dismissal of the original com-
plaint was granted (R. p. 11). From· this judgme~t of dis-
missal, Plaintiff appeals. 
The sole question to be determined in this appeal, is 
whether Plaintiff, either in the original or in the amended com-
plant, has stated a cause of action upon which relief should 
be granted. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
Ownership of property abuttit;1g both sides of a street 
includes ownership of the street itself, subject only to the use 
of the same by the public for highway purposes. 
POINT II 
The unauthorized laying_ of a water pipe line by a muni-
cipality in a street outside of its corporate limits, which line 
in no way benefits or serves the abutting property, is an addi-
tional burden upon the property, constituting an invasion of 
the abutting O\vner' s rights, and is actionable. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY ABUTTING BOTH 
SIDES OF A STREET INCLUDES OWNERSHIP OF THE 
STREET ITSELF, SUBJECT ONLY TO THE USE OF THE 
SAME BY THE PUBLIC FOR HIGHWAY PURPOSES. 
Appellant, in the original and amended complaints, al-
leged ownership of property abutting both sides of the streets 
in question, and a property interest in the street itself. Ap-
pellant contends that this interest is the ownership of the fee, 
subject to the public's use thereof for highway purposes. Our 
statutes, and cases decided thereunder, are very clear on these 
points. 
Section 36·1-1, Utah Code Annotated 1943, reads as fol-
lows: 
"In all counties all roads, streets, alleys, lanes, courts, 
places, trails and bridges laid out or erected as such 
by the public, or dedicated or abandoned to the public, 
or made such in actions for the partition of real prop-
erty, are public highways." 
In Section 36·1· 7, Utah Code Annotated 1943, we find 
the following: 
"By taking or accepting land for a highway the 
public acquires only the right of way and incidents 
necessary to enjoying ahd maintaining it. A transfer 
of land bounded by a highway passes .the title of the 
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It is clear from these two sections of the Statutes, that the 
streets in question are categorically classified as ((highways," 
and that the Plaintiff, in owning the abutting property, owns 
to the center of the highway, subject only to the right of the 
public in the same as a right of way. 
The Respondent relied upon Section 78-5-4, Utah Code 
Annotated 1943, contending that the County of Salt Lake 
O\vned the streets in question, and it was upon this statute· that 
the District Court granted the order of dismissal of the original 
(Om plaint. 
Section 78-5-4 has the following provisions: 
C(Such maps and plats, when made, acknowledged, 
filed and recorded, shall operate as a dedication of all 
such streets, alleys and other public places, and shall 
vest the fee of such parcels of land as are therein ex-
pressed, named or intended for public uses in such 
county, city or town for the public for the uses therein 
nanv~d or intended.'' 
However, Sowadzki vs. Salt Lake County, 104 Pac. 111, 
at page 116, construed Chapter 50, Laws of 1890, page 76, which 
is the forerunner of Section 78-5-4 quoted above, and which is 
substantially the· same in wording, and identical in ~earring. 
In the S~wadzki case, our Supreme Court said: 
. cc\X'hile the word cfee' is used in 'the section, it js 
clear from what follows that it was not intended that 
the fee of the corpus or land itself . should pass, but 
only the fee to the -surface, and this only for public 
use for all purposes of a street or highway. The fee 
mentioned in the statute was thus what is known as 
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a J ani ted or determinable fee, and was created for a 
special purpose or purposes only, and hence was sub-
ject of abandonment." 
Thus, from the foregoing Sections of our code and the 
Sowadzki case, it must be concluded that neithe~ the public 
nor the County of Salt Lake owned the fee interest in the 
corpus of the streets described in the complaint. The fee 
title belongs to the abutting owner. In fact, the County owns 
nothing. Only a right of use exists in the public for highway 
purposes. Consequently, the Appellant in the instant case 
has a property interest in the street which is subject to an inva-
sion or damage. 
POINT II 
THE UNAUTHORIZED LAYING OF A WATER 
PIPE LINE BY A MUNICIPALITY IN A STREET OUT-
SIDE OF ITS CORPORATE ~IMITS, WHICH LINE IN NO 
WAY BENEFITS OR SERVES THE ABUTTING PROP-
ERTY, IS AN ADDITIONAL BURDEN UPON THE PROP-
. ERTY, CONSTITUTING AN INVASION OF THE ABUT-
TING OWNER'S RIGHTS, AND IS ACTIONABLE. 
We are next concerned with whether there is alleged an 
invasion of Appellant's property . interest in the street, which 
is actionable. 
In the original and amended complaints, Appellant al-
leged that the unauthorized laying of the water pipe line in 
the street was a trespass. In the amended complaint, there 
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\vas an allegation also that the use of the street by the Re-
spondent in such· a way as to interfere with the normal use 
thereof by Appellant in servicing his own property, was an 
invasion of Appellant's property rights in and to the street. 
Tiffany on Real Property, 3rd Edition, Vol. 3, paragraph 
926, under the subject of Additional Servitudes, at pages 603-04 
has this to say: 
H • • • The use of a street or highway for sewers, 
gas pipes, or water pipes, is a legitimate use, for which 
the owner of the fee cannot recover compensation, 
unless it is not for the benefit of the community itself, 
or the rnembers thereof, but is for the benefit :of another· 
municipality, or of individuals alone . .. "(Italics ours.) 
This pr-inciple as contained in Tiffany, which appears to be 
universal, is supported by many cases. Some of them refer 
to the laying of gas mains; others, sewers; and still others, 
water mains, such as concern us in the instant case. 
The court was concerned with the laying of a gas line 
in a county highway, outside the municipality thereby served, 
in Sterling's Appeal, 2 Atl. 105, a Pennsyl:vania case. The 
court said: 
ccln Bloomfield and Rochester Natural Gas-Light Co. 
vs. Calkins, 62 N.Y. 386, it was held that a corporation 
organized under an act similar to ours, authorizing 
formation of gas-light companies, has no authority to 
lay its pipes in a country highway without the consent 
of, or without the appraisal and payn1ent of c_ompensa-
tion to, the owner of the land. There is no reason :why 
this should not be the rule with respect to public roads 
in the rural districts.'' 
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In Kincaid vs~ -Indianapolis Natural Gas Co. (Indiana), 
24 N. E. 1066, the Gas Company laid mains in a highway out-
side of the municipality to be served. The court said: 
cc •• ~ The appropriation of the land for a rural high-
way did not entitle the local officers to use it for any 
other highway purposes, although they did acquire a 
right to use. it for all purposes legitimately connected 
with the local system of highways. A use for any 
other than a legitimate highway purpose is a taking 
within the meaning of the Constitution, inasmuch as 
it imposes an additional burden upon the land, and 
whenever land is subjected to an additional burden 
the owner is entitled to compensation. The authorities, 
~!thought not very numerous, are harmonious upon the 
question that laying gas-pipes in a suburban road is 
the imposition of an additional burden, and that. 
compensation must be made . . . " 
Several cases are cited in this case in support of the legal 
principle. 
The Ward vs. Triple State Natural Gas & Oil Co. case, 
74 S. W. 709, decided by the Kentucky Supreme Court, present-
ed a similar situation. The Kentucky Supreme Court handed 
down the same ruling as the Kincaid case, citing it as an 
authority for so doing. 
The problem of a municipality laying a line (this time 
a sewer line) in a street outside the corporate limits of the 
city thereby served, was involved in the case of Y an Brunt, 
et. al., vs. Town of Flatbush, et. al., 27 N. E. 973, a New York 
case. 
In this case, the Town of Flatbush constructed a sewer 
10 
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line to discharge sewer into the ocean, and in so doing, laid 
the line over and through a street in a sparsely-populated sec-
tion of Flatlands, another community. Inasmuch as there 
was only an easement over the street in the public, the court 
held that the Town of Flatbush must condemn and pay for the 
land, saying: 
~'The sewer belongs exclusively to the Town of Flat-
bush, and is solely for the benefit of the inhabitants 
thereof. Under such circumstances, what right have the 
commissioners to enter upon the lands of the Plaintiffs 
and dig up their soil and place sewers therein without 
· their consent and without compensation to them? We 
can perceive none, and we know of no principle of law 
and of no authority which can justify them . . . '' . 
In the case at bar, the City of Salt Lake is attempting to use 
the land of the Plaintiff to lay a water pipe line, in which the 
public only has an easement for highway purposes, which line 
is "solely for the benefit of the inhabitants" of Salt Lake City. 
Applying the principle of the foregoing case, this cannot be 
done without securing the consent of, and compensating the 
Plaintiff. 
One of the questions which came up in Rouse vs. Kinston, . 
123 S. E. 482, a North Carolina case, was whether an abutting 
owner to a highway outside the limits of a municipality, was 
entitled to compensation for the laying of a water main under 
the surface of the highway by the municipality. The court, 
stating that the abutting owner held the fee interest, on page 
486, had this to say: 
"In the present case, the defendant denies the right 
of Plaintiff to recover damages for the pipe line run-
11 
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ning along the state highway No. 10, plaintiff having 
a fee simple title to the land. In Teeter v. Postal Teleg.-
Cable Co., 172 N. C. 785, 90 S. E. 941, it is said: 'It 
is not denied by defendant that the telegraph line 
superimposed upon a railroad right of way is· an addi-
tional burden which entitled the owner to compensa-
tion. Hodges v. Western U. Teleg. Co., 133 N. C. 225, 
45 S. E. 572; Phillips v. Postal Teleg.-Cable Co., 130 
N. C. 513, 89 Am. St. Rep. 868, 41 S. E. 1022'. 
"To the same effect is a \Vater main." 
In Hofius vs. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., ( 1946) 146 
Ohio St. 574, 67 NE (2) 429, we have a case which is identical 
with the one at bar. In the Hofius case, there was an attempt 
to construct a water main in a highway outside a municipality 
by a village for the benefit of domestic and industrial users 
of the village. 
· The court held that the public's interest tn a highway 
outside the municipality is an easement for the purpose of 
public travel, with the fee remaining in the abutting land-
owner. Then the court had this to say in the syllabus, which 
was borne out in the opinion itself: 
"The construction of a water main in a highway 
outside a municipality by a village for the benefit of 
domestic and industrial water users of the village con-
stitutes an additional burden upon the fee of the abut- · 
ting owner." 
Numerous cases .are cited in the Hofius case in support of 
the doctrine therein accepted. 
Counsel for Appellant has checked each of the foregoing 
cases in Shepard's Citator, and not one of them ha~ been over-
ruled or modified by a later decision. 
12 
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CONCLUSION 
In view of the foregoing; there can be but one conclusion. 
The Plaintiff, having alleged in his complaint that he, as the 
abutting owner, is the owner of the fee of the streets in ques-
tion, subject only to the right of way in the public for highway 
purposes, and the laying of the water pipe line therein by Salt 
Lake City, the Respondent, without first having obtained the 
consent of the Plaintiff owner, has set forth, both in the original 
and amended complaints, a cause of action. 
Thus, Appellant urges this Honorable court to reverse the 
judgment of the trial court dismissing the original and amended 
complaints, with instructions to the trial court to require Re-
spondent to file its answer thereto, and to proceed to hear the 
matter on its merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM D. CALLISTER 
and A. C. MEL VILLE, 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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